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A REVIEW OF THE CASES ON "BLUE SKY"
LEGISLATION
By MONTREVILLE J. BRoWN'
Since then
RIoR to 1910 there were no "Blue Sky Laws."
nearly all of the states have enacted them. They are in
essential respects the same; and are not now open to constitutional objections. In 1917 cases involving the acts of Michigan,
South Dakota and Ohio attacked as violative of the fundamental
law went to the Supreme Court of the United States; and that
court upheld them upon the broad ground that they were expressive of a legitimate exercise of the police power. 2 Since the
decisions in these cases litigation has been largely conducted in
the state courts and most of the questions raised have called for
construction and interpretation; some cases have dealt with
matters of criminal pleading and procedure. It is the purpose
of this article to take up the more important of these questions
and matters and consider them in the light of the holdings of
the appellate courts of the various states. In so far as possible
consideration of cases will be confined to those of substantially
general application.
The purpose of "Blue Sky Laws" has been oft expressed.'
It is deemed sufficient to state that they are designed to prevent
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2Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., (1917) 242 U.S. 539, 61 L.Ed. 489, 37 S.C.R.
217; Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stockyards Co., (1917) 242 U.S. 559, 61 L.Ed.
493, 37 S.C.R. 224; Merrick v. Halsey & Co., (1917) 242 U.S. 568, 61

L.Ed. 498, 37 S.C.R. 227.
Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., (1917) 242 U.S. 539, 61 L.Ed. 480, 37 S.C.R.
217; Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stockyards Co., (1917) 242 U.S. 559, 61
L.Ed. 493, 37 S.C.R. 224; Merrick v. Halsey & Co., (1917) 242 U.S. 568,
61 L.Ed. 498, 37 S.C.R. 227; State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., (1920)
146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937; State v. Agey, (19.16) 171 N.C. 813, 88 S.E.
726; Goodyear v. Meux, (1920) 143 Tenn. 287, 228 S.W. 57.
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fraud in the sale of specified contracts usually -designated as
stocks, bonds, investment contracts, or other securities. In administering and enforcing the law so as to effectuate the intent,
one or the other of the two questions frequently arises. Is the
corporation, association, concern or person proposing to sell
subject to the law? Is the law regulatory of the sale of the
particular contract proposed to be sold? These are the questions;
and answers given thereto by those charged with carrying out
the legislation have not always met with the approval of applicants, with the result that the courts have from time to time been
resorted to. The decisions deal more with these questions than
with any others.
PERSONS AND CONCERNS SUBJECT TO THE LAW

The typical law excludes from its purview certain securities
and single or isolated transactions; then defines investment company and dealer and prohibits sales by either unless licensed.
Exceptions in the various laws differ; but the provisions defining
investment company and dealer and requiring license are, for all
practical purposes, the same. The exceptions speak for themselves and only incidental consideration will be given thereto.
The difficulty arises when commissioners are called upon to
determine whether a given seller is an investment company or
dealer within the meaning of the law. This question under
various states of fact has been before the courts of several of
the states; and it is to the decisions of these courts on this
question that attention will first be directed.
For a number of years some doubt was entertained as to
whether trustees are subject to the law in the sale of certificates
of interest in the property and assets held by them under a
common law declaration of trust. The question has been passed
on by the courts of California, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan and Missouri. These courts hold them subject to the law in making such
sale. They are viewed in some of the cases as constituting an investment company, and in others as the agents of an investment
company, such investment company operating as an unincorporated- association.4 The rule of amenability is recognized as
settled law; and commissioners are now without exception, so
4In re Girard, (1921) 186 Cal. 718. 200 Pac. 593; Home Lumber Co.
v. Hopkins, (1920) 107 Kan. 153, 190 Pac. 601, 10 A.L.R. 879; People v.
Clum, (1921) 312 Mich. 651, 182 N.W. 136, 15 A.L.R. 253; Schmidt v.
Startz, (1922) 208 Mo. App. 439, 236 S.W. 694; Wagner v. Kelso, (Ia.
1923) 193 N.W. 1.
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far as the writer is advised, applying it within their respective
jurisdictions.
Aside from the standing of so-called common law trusts, no
difficulty general to the administration of' the law has been encountered in determining whether or not a given applicant is
an investment company. If a concern is the issuer of a security
and is selling the security, it is an investment company and subject
to the law.
When it comes to the question whether one selling a security
issued by another is a daler, the answer is not always free from
doubt. A recent case in which this question was passed upon
is that of State ex rel. Gutterson v. Pearson, et al.5 It is of such'
far-reaching consequences that a somewhat detailed consideration
thereof is deemed appropriate.
The case arose in this way: Plaintiff was about to sell fifteen
thousand shares of the common and fifteen thousand shares of
the preferred stock of the New England Cereal Company, when
he was informed by the commission that he could not lawfully
sell the stock without its approval, and that if he sold or attempted
to sell the same without such approval, it would take steps to
put a stop thereto and bring about the criminal prosecution of
all offending parties. Under the belief that the securities law
had no application to the sale by him of these securities, he
brought an action to restrain the commission from in any way
interfering with him in the sale thereof. A demurrer to the
complaint was sustained in the lower court. An appeal was taken
to the supreme court where there was a reversal.
The material facts were few. Plaintiff's business was buying
and selling stocks and bonds. He maintained an office in the
city of Minneapolis. He was the absolute owner of the stock
he proposed to sell in the course of his business. The New
England Cereal Company, the issuer of the stock, was a Connecticut corporation; and had never been, and was not at the
time, engaged in the business of selling its stock in Minnesota.
Plaintiff's position was based on the wording of sections 3
and 4, chapter 429, Laws of Minnesota 1917, as amended by
sections 4 and 5, chapter 105, Laws of Minnesota 1919, and the
use in various provisions of the law of the expression "such
securities." These sections at the time the case was decided
read as follows:
s(Minn. 1922) 189 N.W. 458.
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"Sec. 3. Every person, firm, co-partnership, corporation,
company or association, whether unincorporated or incorporated,
under the laws of this or any other state, territory or government, which shall either himself, themselves or itself, or by or
through others engage in the business within the state of Minnesota of selling, offering or negotiating for the sale of any stocks,
bonds, investment contracts or other securities, herein-called
securities (except those exempt under the provisions of this act),
issued by him, them or it, except to a bank or a trust company,
shall be known, for the purpose of this act, as an investment
company.
"Every person, firm, co-partnership, company, corporation or
association, whether unincorporated or incorporated under the
laws of this or any other state, territory or government, not the
issuer, who shall within, the state of Minnesota sell or offer for
sale any of the stocks, bonds, investment contracts, or other securities herein called securities, issued by an investment company,
except the securities specifically exempt under the provisions of
this act, or who shall by advertisement or otherwise profess to
engage in the business of selling or offering for sale such securities within the state of Minnesota, shall be known for the purpose
of .this act as a dealer. The term dealer shall not include an
owner, not issuer, of such securities so owned by him when such
sale is not made in the course of continued and successive transactions .of a similar nature, nor one who in a trust capacity
created by law lawfully sells any securities embraced within such
trust."
.Section 4 provides that:
"No such investment company and no such dealer shall sell
or offer for sale any such securities or profess the business of
selling or offering for sale such securities, unless and until he or
it shall have been licensed by the commission as herein provided ... "
In view of the wording of section 3, plaintiff urged that an
investment company was one engaged in the business within the
state of selling securities issued by it; that a dealer was one selling within the state securities of an investment company or companies; that, as the New England Cereal Company was not
engaged in the business of selling its stock in this state, it was
not an investment company; and that in selling the stock of that
company owned by him, he was not selling the stock of an investment company; and as a consequence, in so far as the selling
of such stock was concerned, was not a dealer and therefore not
subject to section 4. He further urged that the expression "such
securities" made use of in the act referred to and meant the
stocks, bonds, investment contracts and other securities of an
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investment company; and that, in view of the fact that the New
England Cereal Company was not an investment company, none
of these provisions, including all of the regulatory features of
the law, had any application to a sale of the stock of that company owned by him.
Plaintiff's contention boiled down amounted to this: The
securities law is only regulatory of the sales of securities of
issuers themselves engaged in the business within the state of
selling such securities.
In answer to this contention it was insisted that the purpose
of the act rendered it necessary to place on section 3 a meaning
contrary to that contended for by plaintiff. The purpose being
to prevent fraud, it was argued that all sales of securities made
within the state, subject to exceptions specified in section 2, fell
within the regulatory features of the law. Where securities were
being sold to the general public, the seller, it was contended, no
matter whether as the owner or the agent of another, was subject
to the law; it was immaterial whether the issuer was or was not
engaged in the sale thereof within the state. This was urged
upon the court as the law applicable to the situation:
"With the purpose and intent of the law in mind, we again
refer to section 3. It is obvious that a literal interpretation of
the language of this section would result in a defeat of the object
sought to be attained by the legislature. In such a situation
there must be a departure from literal interpretation; we must
so construe the section as to bring it in harmony with the purpose
and intent of the act. Words may be eliminated or particular
terms given an extended or qualified meaning; this, that the act
may be potent to eradicate the mischief aimed at, and to avoid a
construction which would result in absurdities. A statute is to
be construed according to the intention of the legislature and not
according to the letter of any section or subdivision thereof; the
part must give way to the purpose as disclosed by the whole.
"The rules of statutory construction here applicable are elementary and a discussion thereof is unnecessary. We content
ourselves with calling attention to some of the decisions of this
court where they have been stated and applied."6
6
Eberd v. Johnson, (1921) 149 Minn. 395, 184 N.W. 12; Thomas v.
Stevenson, (1920) 146 Minn. 272, 276, 178 N.W. 1021; State ex rel. Chase
v. Minn. Tax Comm., (1916) 135 Minn. 205, 207, 160 N.W. 498; State ex
rel. Maryland Casualty Co. v. District Court, (1916). 134 Minn. 131, 158
N.W. 798; Street v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., (1914) 124 Minn. 517, 521, 145
N.W. 746; State ex rel. v. Bates, (1905) 96 Minn. 110. 112, 104 N.W.
709; Mariston v. McIntosh, (1894) 58 Minn. 252, 528. 60 N.W. 672, 28
L.R.A. 605: Clementson v. Minnesota Tribune Co., (1891) 45 Minn. 303,
304, 47 N.W. 781. See also 25 R.C.L. 967, 970, 973, 1006, 1007, 1008, 1009;
Dunnell's Minnesota Digest, secs. 8939, 8940, 8947, 8951, 8985.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

The court declined to adopt the view advanced in behalf of
the commission. It held the law did not prohibit a person, the
absolute owner of stock issued by a company not itself engaged
in the business of selling within the state, from selling such stock
without a license. The law, it was ruled, had no application to
such a case.
During the course of the court's opinion it was said:
"An 'investment company' as defined in section 3, is one which
either itself or through others engages in the business within this
state of selling or offering for sale securities issued by itself. A
'dealer' as defined in that section, is one, not an issuer, who within
this state sells or offers for sale securities issued by an 'investment company.' Section 4 prohibits any 'such investment company' and any 'such dealer' from selling or offering for sale 'any
such securities' until licensed by the commission as therein provided. These prohibitory provisions do not purport to apply to
an issuer of securities unless such issuer be an 'investment company' as defined in section three, nor to one, not an issuer, who
buys and sells securities unless he be a 'dealer' as defined in that
section. It stands admitted that the New England Cereal Company has never, in any manner, sold securities or offered them
for sale within the state of Minnesota, and consequently that company is not an 'investment company' within the purview of the
statute. As the company which issued the securities offered for
sale by plaintiff is not an 'investment company' within the meaning of the statute, selling such securities or offering them for
sale did not make plaintiff a 'dealer' within the meaning of the
statute, nor bring him within the prohibitory provisions of section
four. Defendants do not contend that the statute, taken as it
reads, applies to plaintiff, but urge that unless it be cofistrued or
extended so .as to bring within its provisions those dealers who
handle securities issued by companies which do not themselves
operate within this state the act can be easily evaded and will
fail to accomplish the legislative purpose. ...
"In order to extend the scope of the statute so as to include
within its operation those who sell securities issued by a company which does not itself sell its securities within this state, they
urge that the words, 'within the state of Minnesota,' in the
paragraph of section 3 which defines investment companies should
be either eliminated or transposed from that section to section 4.
If the Legislature had done this we might be able to give the
statute the broad scope contended for. But this is a highly penal
statute, and the courts cannot extend a penal statute to take in
those whom the Legislature has left out, nor so as to make acts
criminal which the Legislature has not declared to be criminal.
Statutes creating crimes must speak for themselves, and cannot
be extended 'by construction to include cases which are clearly
outside the statute as enacted by the Legislature.'7
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This decision resulted in curbing the activities of the Minnesota commission to a very appreciable extent; that body had
assumed jurisdiction prior to its rendition of all sales of the
character of the one under consideration. Its effect was to open
the door to the unscrupulous and visionary. The legislature took
.cognizance of the situation and at its recent session remedied the
defect in the law by enacting chapter 4, Laws 1923. This law
amends the sections above quoted so as to make them read as
follows:
"Sec. 3. Every peison, firm, co-partnership, corporation, company or association, whether unincorporated or incorporated,
under the laws of this or any other state, territory, or government,
which shall either himself, themselves or itself, or by or through
others engage in the business within the state of Minnesota of
selling, offering or negotiating for the sale of any stocks, bonds,
investment contracts or other securities, issued by him, them or
it, except to a bank or trust company, shall be known, for the
purpose of this act, as an investment company.
"Every person, firm, co-partnership, company, corporation or
association, whether unincorporated or incorporated under the
laws of this or any other state, territory or government, not the
issuer, who shall within the state of Minnesota sell or offer for
sale any stocks, bonds, investment contracts or other securities or
who shall by advertisement or otherwise profess to engage in the
business of selling or offering for sale any stocks, bonds, investment contracts or other securities within the state of Minnesota,
shall be known for the purpose of this act as a dealer. The term
dealer shall not include an owner, not issuer, of any stocks,
bonds, investment contracts, or other securities so owned
by him when such sale is not made in the course of continued
and successive transactions of a similar nature, nor one who in a
trust capacity created by law lawfully sells any stocks, bonds, investment contracts, or other securities, embraced within such
trust.
"Sec. 4. No such investment company and no such dealer
shall sell or offer for sale any stocks, bonds, investment contracts,
or other securities, or profess the business of selling or offering
for sale any stocks, bonds, investment contracts, or other securities, (all of which are in this act referred to under the general
term of and called securities) unless and until he or it shall have
been licensed by the commission as herein provided. .. "
There are other cases in which courts have been called upon
to decide whether the seller involved was a dealer; but these have
7
The following cases were cited in support of the court's position:
State v. Finch, (1887) 37 Minn. 433, 34 N.W. 904; State v. Walsh, (1890)
43 'Minn. 444. 45 N.W. 721; Berg v. Baldwin, (1884) 31 Minn. 541. 18
N.W. 821; Mahoney v. Maxfield, (1907) 102 'Minn. 377, 113 N.W. 904,
14 L. R. A. (N.S.) 251. 12 Ann. Cas. 289.
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to do with the interpretation of the following language made a
part of the definition of dealer:
"The term dealer shall not include an owner, not issuer, of
such securities so owned by him when such sale is not made in
the course of continued and successive transactions of a similar
nature."
The purpose and effect of this provision is stated in the case
of Edward v. Joor,8 in this way:
"The record discloses that defendant Ioor was the owner of
100 shares of stock of the Illinois -Piano Company. He sold 27
of these shares to the plaintiff. He sold no other shares of stock
of this company. Section 10 of the Commission Act (Section
11954, Comp. Laws 1915) defines the term 'dealer,' and so far as
important here provides:
"'The term 'dealer' shall not include an owner, not issuer, of
such securities so owned by him when such sale is not made in
the course of continued and successive transactions of a similar
nature.'
"This provision was thought important by the framers of
this act to remove the question of unconstitutional taint, and preserve the constitutional right of the individual to sell his own
stock, but by prohibiting 'continued and successive transactions
of a similar nature' prevented the abuse of that right and its
exercise in a manner contrary to the spirit of the act. Mr. Ioor
had the right to sell this stock to plaintiff. He did not by continued and successive transactions of a similar nature become a
dealer. He was acting within his constitutional rights, and by
this sale to plaintiff did not violate the act. No liability can be
predicated on this transaction."'
SECURITIES COVERED BY LAW

The other question which has been most frequently before
the courts is whether the contract sold or proposed to be sold is
a ,tock, a bond, an investment contract or other security within
the meaning of the law. This question is often 'difficult of
answer. A review of the cases in which it has been disposed of
is next in order.
The pioneer in this field is the case of State v. Gopher Tire
& Rubber Company."0 Defendant, a Minnesota concern, was
indicted charged with selling an investment contract without a
license. A demurrer was interposed to the indictment and overruled by the court. Certain questions were certified to the
8(1919) 205 Mich. 617, 172 NV. 620, 16 A.L.R. 256.
9
See also Dows v. Schuh, (1919) 206 Mich. 133, 172 N.W. 418;
Dorsun v. Benedict, (1920) 209 Mich. 115, 176 N.W. 459; State v. Summerland, (1921) 150 Minn. 266, 185 N.W. 255.
10(1920) 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937.
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supreme court for answer. Among them was the question
whether the contract was an investment contract or other security.
The court answered the question in the affirmative.
The company was engaged in the business of manufacturing
automobile tires and inner tubes. The indictment set out the
contract alleged to have been sold. This recited that defendant
had appointed the holder as one of its agents to assist by word
of mouth and in other ways in selling the tires and tubes manufactured by the issuer. It provided that in consideration of the
certificate holder's promise to render such assistance and in further consideration of $50.00 paid by him, the issuing company,
defendent, would divide pro rata among all the holders of like
certificates residing in a specified place 10 per cent of the net
price of such tires and tubes as might be sold by defendant's
representatives at such place, such division to be made quarterly
for a period of twenty years; that the holder would be entitled
to a discount of 10 per cent. on all of the defendant's goods which
he might purchase for his personal use; and that defendant
would annually set aside as a bonus to certificate holders all of
its excess earnings after paying operating expenses, fixed charges
and dividends to stockholders. The contract was designated by
the issuer as a certificate; was' transferable upon notice; and
contained a clause stating that it was not to be construed to be a
certificate of stock or security or investment contract.
On the question whether this was an investment contract the
court had this to say:
"'No case has been called to our attention defining the term
'investment contract.' The placing of capital or laying out of
money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its
employment is an investment as that word'is commonly used and
understood. If defendant issued and sold its certificates to purchasers who paid their money, justly expecting to receive an
income or profit from the investment, it would seem that the
statute should apply. The statute makes specific mention of stock
which, properly spealdng, is not a security, and follows the
enumeration of investments which fall within its scope with the
words, 'herein called securities,' indicating that the legislature has
not used the term 'securities' in a literal but in a broad sense. In
that sense, these certificates may properly be regarded as investment contracts or securities. The mere fact that defendant has
studiously declared that they are not, does not require a court to
hold that they are something else.
"We cannot sustain defendant's contention that the certificates
are contracts for the performance of services by its agents. The
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purchaser pays $50 for a certificate in addition to agreeing to
become a 'booster agent' for the sale of defendant's goods. As
an inducement to invest, he is promised a share in defendant's
profits. This promise extends, first to the profits realized on
sales made by the local dealer, and, next, to defendant's total
proffts. It appears to have been the purpose of defendant to
obtain capital by the sale of its certificates, without issuing
stock, and, at the same time, to build up a market for its
goods, without spending money in advertising. The certificates
are like stock in that they give their holders the right to share in
the profits of the corporation, but their value is purely speculative,
for their holders get no interest in the tangible assets of the corporation."
The Minnesota court has had occasion to apply the doctrine
of this case on several occasions."
In the Sumnimerland Case the defendants were charged with
selling certain securities issued by the Alexandria Minnesota Oil
Syndicate,. an unincorporated association: The securities were
described in the indictment as "three units of the par value of
$100 each, each of which said units entitled the owner thereof
to an individual beneficial interest in and to the property and
assets of said association and in and to the profits resulting from
the operation thereof (such unit being registered in the books
-of said association in the name of the owner thereof) to participate in the management and control of the business and affairs
of said association by casting one vote at any meeting of the
unit holders of said association upon any question coming before
such meeting." The court was called upon to say whether these
were investment contracts or other securities; and on this point

said :
"It fairly appears from the whole indictment that the 'oil
syndicate' was an investment company issuing the same sort of
investment contracts within the meaning of the first paragraph of
section 3. The so-called 'units' are fairly within the definition
of investment contracts as defined in State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Company. 146 Minn. "52, 177 N. W. 937."
In the Evans and Re. nolds Case the defendants were charged
with violating the law in selling a contract entitled by the issuer
"3 Per Cent. Contract for Deed." They demurred to the indictment. This was overruled by the lower court. The question
whether the instrument set out in the indictment was an invest-

"State v. Summerland. (1921) 150 Minn. 266, 185 N.W. 255; State
v. Evans and Reynolds, (Minn. 1922) 191 N.W. 425; State v. Ogden,
(Minn. 1923) 191 N.W. 916.
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ment contract was certified to the supreme court for answer. The
court held that it was such a contract.
The contract before the court was in form a contract for
deed. Attached to it and made a part thereof were various options
open to the purchaser. One of these gave to the purchaser under
certain 'conditions a right to surrender his contract and receive
back the money he had paid with a bonus. Another gave the
purchaser, after fifty regular monthly payments had been made,
if other options had not been exercised, the absolute right to
apply the amount paid with interest to build a home, to buy or
improve a farm, or to buy or improve business property, and if
the amount accumulated should not be sufficient therefor, the
company agreed to advance the balance on real estate security.
Other options were given.
The court held this contract to fall within the rule of the
Gopher Tire & Rubber Company Case, saying:
"It is plain that the exercise of some of these options converts
the contract into one for the laying out or investment of money
in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment. . . . We are of opinion that this contract is an investment
contract within the statute."
In the Ogden "Casethe defendant was convicted of a violation
of the law. He appealed to the supreme court and made the
point that the tontract he was charged with selling was not an
investment contract or other security. The court sustained the
conviction.
The contract is this case was styled "Statement and Purchase." It recited that defendant had subdivided a leasehold of
an eighty acre tract of land in Bighorn County, Wyoming, into
4,800 equal undivided units or fractional interests and was offering 3,000 thereof for sale at $120,000, and that each purchaser
purchased separately the number of units set opposite his name.
The instrument was signed and acknowledged by the defendant.
Following his acknowledgment was a statement with indicated
places for signatures of the purchasers, and other data. A purchase of units was made subject under the terms of the instrument to the condition that all money paid was 'to go to the
defendant as treasurer, to be disbursed for obligations incur'ed,
or to be incurred, in connection with the leasehold. This included the obligation on defendant's part to clean out and connect with a pipeline three oil wells on the premises and to drill
six additional oil wells and connect with the pipe line.. Defend-
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ant was required to render an account to" the purchasers of
moneys received and paid out by him. He was to incorporate
a company under the Arizona statutes to hold the lease. Provision was made for a board of directors and an executive committee. The company was to have power to operate all of the
wells and from the net amounts derived therefrom, the owners
bf the units. were to be paid their respective portions. Defendant
agreed to assign his leasehold to this corporation.
Thi court held this instrument to be an investment contract
or other security, saying:
"It differs, of course, from other contracts which we have
had before us, but it is an investment contract within State v.
Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 53, 177 N. W. 937; State
v. Summerland, 150 Minn. 266, 185 N. W. 255; and State v.
Evans, 191 N. W. 425. The purpose was not to convey undivided interests in the land. The purchasers did not intend
to become freeholders or land owners. The intent was that the
five-eighths interest in the leasehold was to go to a corporation
thereafter to be organized; The defendant agreed to do certain
things proper to be done to effect this result. Finally, the unit
holders were to participate in profits in proportion to their holdings and were to be interested in the same proportion in the corporation holding the title and operating. The arrangement was
legitimate, so far as appears, and convenient enough. The paternalistic purpose of the statute is to prevent offering to the public,
not land contracts, but investment contracts, evidencing a right
to -participate in the proceeds of a venture, without the commission first ascertaining whether there is behind the venture something so tangible that a sound policy of regulation permits the
exposing the investing public to them. This is an investment
contract within the statute. It is one to which the requirement
of a license applies."
Other courts have been called upon to determine the standing
of instruments being offered for sale. 12 The decisions in these
cases deal with provisions peculiar to the law involved. The
Welch and Agev Cases, however, define terms and expressions
found in many laws and will, as a consequence, be specially considered.
In the Welch Case defendant was charged with selling speculative securities without a license. The North Dakota law expressly prohibited the sale of such securities without approval.
12
State ex rel. Rossen v. Welch, (1919) 42 N.D. 44, 172 N.W. 234;
State v. Agey, (1916) 171 N.C. 831, 88 S.E. 726; Kirk v. Farmers Union
Grain Agency, (1921) 103 Ore. 43, 202 Pac. 731; State v. Lee, (1921) 288
Mo. 41, 233 S.W. 20; Standard Home Co. v. Davies, State Bank Commissioner, (1914) 217 Fed. 904.
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Defendant contended that the contract sold by him did not come
within the definition of speculative securities as set out in the
law. The court disagreed with him and denied his application
for a writ of habeas corpus.
The criminal complaint charged petitioner, without first complying with the act, with selling "an agreement or buyers' certificate of the Lignite Consumers' Mining Company of North
Dakota." It was alleged that this was a speculative security.
The certificate was set out in the complaint. It provided in
substance:
"that in consideration of the sum of $100, to be paid in cash
or note to the Lignite Consumers' Mining Company, a corporation
to be formed under the laws of this siate not later than October
1, 1919, the said mining company agrees to utilize 90 per cent.
of all the moneys secured to establish a mine at or near Havelock,
North Dakota, until the sum of $200,000 shall be so applied; and
that all surplus subscribed over said sum may be used either to
maintain a mine or other mines within this state, or to carry on
educational'work or experiments with the lignite coal, or its byproducts; that the Lignite Consumers' Mining Company agrees to
establish its mine at or near Havelock, North Dakota, not later
than October 1, 1919, or as soon thereafter as is possible; and
that it will immediately thereafter issue to each member or signer
of the agreement, a certificate granting him or it the right to purchase coal at said mine or any other mine or mine' said company
may establish at a price not to exceed $1.50 per ton, or as much
lower as the board of directors may deem advisable to sell coal
per ton."

The act made the sale of speculative securities unlawful in
the absence of a compliance by the seller of certain requirements,
the term "speculative securities" being defined as follows:
"The term 'speculative securities' as used in this act shall be
taken to mean and include: (1) All securities into the specified
par value of which the element of chance, speculative profit, or
possible loss equal or predominate over the elements of reasonable certainty, safety, and investment; (2) all securities the value
of which materially depends on proposed or promised future
promotion or development rather than on present tangible assets
and conditions; (3) any securities based in whole or materi .l
part on assets consisting of patents, formulae, good will, promotion, or intangible' assets; (4) securities made or issued in
furtherance of promotion of any enterprise or scheme for the
sale of unimproved or undeveloped land on any deferred payments
or instalment plan when the principal value of such securities
depends on the future performance of any stipulation by the promoters of such enterprise to furnish irrigation or transportation
facilities, or other value enhancing utility or improvement."
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On the question whether the certificate came within this
definition the court, said:
"It is contended that the contract or agreement which the
defendant'sold is not a 'speculative security,' within the terms of
the act. ..In our opinion the contention is wholly untenable. The
statute expressly declares that the term 'speculative securities' as
used therein shall be taken to mean all stock certificates, shares,
bonds, debentures, certificates of participation, contracts, contracts or bonds for the sale and conveyance of land on deferred
payments or instalment plan, or other instruments in this nature
by whatsoever name known or called, into the par value of which
the element of chance, speculative profit, or possible loss equal
or predominate over the elements of reasonable certainty, safety,
and investment; or the value of which materially depends on proposed or promised future promotion or development rather than
on present tangible assets and conditions.
The certificate which the realtor sold for $100 is to be issued
in the future. It is to be issued by a corporation to be organized
in the future. The mines from which coal is to be sold are to be'
developed in the future. It seems too clear for argument that the
transaction falls squarely within the terms of the statute. The
value of the certificate which the relator sold is manifestly dependent upon the future promotion and development of the mines.
It also seems entirely clear that reasonable men would be entirely
justified in finding that the element of chance, speculative profit,
or possible loss, equal or predominate over the elements of certainty, safety, and investment."
In the Agey Case the defendant was the agent of a Tennessee
corporation authorized under the laws of that state to buy and
sell real estate. It bought large tracts of land in Georgia which
it divided into lots. Through defendant it sold these lots on
contract in South Carolina. No license was obtained under the
"Blue Sky Law" and defendant was tried and found guilty of
a violation thereof. On appeal to the supreme court the question
was presented whether the company was an investment company
and whether the sale of the contract in question came within the
law.
The contract contained these guarantees on the part of the
company:
"'The company guarantees to scientifically develop, cultivate,
prune, and take care of said orchard plot or plots for five years,
and, upon completion of the payments as above set forth, to make.
*execute, and delier to the purchaser hereof a general warranty
deed for the number of plots mentioned above, which shall have at
that time 200 living trees thereon.' And 'The company guarantees
the purchaser hereof 3 cents per pound for all fruit grown on
said trees delivered at the preserving plant in good condition.'"
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The South Carolina law at the time provided as follows:
"Before any bond, investment, dividend, guarantee, registry,
title guarantee, debenture, or such other like company (not strictly
an insurance company as defined in this chapter), or any individual, corporation or copartnership who shall be agents, offer
for sale or sell the stocks, bonds, or obligations of any foreign
corporation, whether organized or to be organized or being promoted, shall be authorized to do business in this state, it must be
licensed by the insurance commissioner, which the commissioner
is authorized to do when he is satisfied that such company or corporation is safe and solvent and has complied with the laws ofthis state applicable to fidelity companies and governing their
admission and supervision by the insurance ,department. If such
company is chartered and organized in this state and has its home
office within the state it may,. if a stock company, commence business with a capital stock of twenty-five thousand dollars, provided
it is solvent to the extent of not less than fifteen thousand dollars.
The license issued to such companies and their agents shall be
issued and paid for as provided for those of insurance companies.
Gregory's Supplement, sec. 4805a, subsec. 1 (ch. 156, Laws
1913), provides:
"Every corporation, company, copartnership or association,
all of which are in this act termed company, organized, proposed
to be organized. or which shall hereafter be organized without
this State, whether incorporated or unincorporated, which shall
in this State sell or negotiate for sale any stocks, bonds, or other
evidences of property, or interest in itself or any other company,
all of which are in this act termed securities, upon which sale or
proposed sale the whole or any part of the proceeds are used, or
to be used, directly or indirectly, for the payment of any commission or other expenses incidental to the organization or promotion of any such company shall be subject to this act."
Applying these provisions of the act to the company and the
contract being sold by it, the court held the company to be an
investment company offering to the public an investment in
lands and fig orchards in Georgia. It also held that the company
was offering the "obligations of said corporation" to cultivate
said land and was giving its contract to make title upon compliance with certain terms; and lastly, that it was offering for sale
within the terms of Laws 1913, Chapter 156, "evidences of
property."
In the very recent Iowa case of Wagner v. Kelso,l,2 a decided on
April 6, 1923, the court was called upon to determine whether
certificates of interest in common law trust constitute "stock"
1
2a(Ia. 1923) 193 N.W. 1.
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within the meaning of the Iowa act providing that every person,
firm, association, company or corporation that shall, either directly
or through representatives or agents, sell, offer or negotiate for
sale within the state any stocks, bonds or other securities, shall,
before doing or offering to do any such business within the state,
be required to secure -a permit of the secretary of state. The
contention was made that "stock," as used in the law means only
corporation stock or shares. The court discussed the point made
quite' extensively. We take the liberty of quoting from the
opinion at some length:
"To say, as do counsel for appellee, that 'stock,' as that word
is here used, means only corporation stock or shares, is to add
to the statute what is not there expressed and to neutralize to
a great extent the evident legislative purpose in enacting it. It
may be admitted that more often than otherwise the word 'stock'
is used with reference to the shares issued by private corporations,
but it is equally true that in common parlance it is often used in
a broader and more general sense of shares in voluntary associations and other enterprises in which many contribute shares for
the promotion of some common purpose. The point made by
appellee is perhaps new in this jurisdiction, but it has been considered and the same or equivalent language construed by other
courts, and, so far as we are able to discover, the authorities are
uniformly opposed to the restricted construction which counsel
would have us approve. See People v.Clum, 213 Mich. 651, 182
N.W. 136, 15 A.L.R. 253; Home Lbr. Co. v.Hopkins, 107 Kan.
153, 190 Pac. 601, 10 A.L.R. 879; Malley v. Bowditch, 259 Fed.
809, 170 C.C.A. 609, 7 A.L.R. 608. It is true that these precedents
were decided under statutes varying in some degree from our
own, but in each the court has considered the question whether
a 'certificate of interest' may fairly be included with the general
term 'stock.' The Malley Case, supra, involved the question
whether a statute imposing a stamp tax upon the issuance of certificates of stock applied to the issuance of certificates of interest
in a common law trust. There, as here, counsel contended that
certificates of interest \vere clearly distinguishable from certificates
of stock, and therefore were not subject to the requirement.
Overruling the point, the court says:
"'We are of'the opinion that, on the original issue of the
certificates of shares of the Pepperell Manufacturing Company,
a.manufacturing company organized in the form of a trust under
the common law, and deriving none of its rights, qualities, or
benefits from any statute, there was required .. .a stamp tax
of five cents each $100 of face value or fraction thereof.'
"After stating the general character of the trust, the court
adds that:
" 'There was thus provided a share capital as a basis for the
issue of transferable certificates evidencing a proportional interest
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therein and carrying with them certain rights while the company is a going concern and in its winding up.'
"Taking up the contention of counsel that such certificates
are not certificates of stock, the court then proceeds to say:
"'The word 'stock' . . . is to be interpreted in connection
with the accompanying words of the statute, association, company, or corporation.' It is a term not peculiar to corporations,
but a term equally applicable to the share capital or fund created
by or in accordance with an agreement for the formation of an
unincorporated association or company . . . . It seems to us
clear that the words 'certificates of stock' contain no implication
of an intent to exclude common law associations or companies.
"A certificate evidencing a transferable share or shares in the
share capital of a manufacturing company, whether incorporated,
quasi incorporated, or wholly unincorporated, is properly described
as a 'certificate of stock.'
"In Kennedy v. Hodges, 215 Mass. 112, 102 N.E. 432, the
court, in considering the question of local jurisdiction of the
ancillary administration of an estate in the assets of which were
included certificates of shares in a trust, says:
"'There is on principle in this respect no distinction between
such certificate and a certificate for shares of stock in a domestic
corporation.'
"In Home Lbr. Co. v. Hopkins, supra, the company was organized as a so-called trust, much after the manner of the company in this case, and question arose whether such company had
complied with the conditions which a statute imposed upon the
right to dispose of securities and stock in that state, and it was
there held that, as the agreement or declaration of trust provided, as does the agreement in this case, giving the company
powers and privileges not possessed by individuals and partnerships, it must conform to the regulations imposed on corporations. The state of Michigan has a 'blue sky law' in all essential
respects quite similar to our own and made applicable with certain
exceptions to 'every person, corporation, copartnership, company
or association,' and forbidding the sale or negotiation of any
stocks, bonds, or other securities until compliance with the conditions named, and making a violation of such statute a punishable misdemeanor.
"In the case of People v,. Clum, supra, the defendant,. having
been convicted of such violation, appealed, and, among other
things, urged as does appellee in this case that, as the association which he represented was not incorporated, but was organized
under the common law as a trust, the so-called 'stock' was therefore not stock within the meaning of the act, but the court held
that"'The shares into which the capital of this association was
divided and for which certificates were issued as stated were
stock within the meaning of the act, the selling and offering for
sale of which were forbidden except as provided by the act.'
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"In the instant case the so-called agreement of trust is so
framed that, if valid, it vests the trustees with all and more than
all the powers usually conferred upon corporations. They have absolute control of all the company's property and assets. The shareholders are expressly excluded from any voice whatever in its
management or business and the only enforceable obligation laid
upon the trustees is to distribute the remnant, if any there be.
of such assets as shall remain when the trust is finally dissolved
and all its debts and obligations discharged. Its capital is a share
capital, evidenced by certificates which may pass from hand to
hand by sale or gift. They expressly provide that the holder has
no authority, power, or right whatsoever to do or transact any
business for or on behalf of or binding on the company, and the
so-called agreement expressly provides that the shareholders shall
have no legal right to the property of the trust and no right to call
for a partition of the property or dissolution of the trust. That
such shareholders in the nebulous and shadowy substance of the
so-called trust are 'stockholders we cannot doubt. The so-called
agreement of trust is evidently drawn with meticulous care to
avoid the use of the words 'stock' and 'stockholder,' and thereby,
if possible, to avoid the bringing the sale of the shares within
the scope of the statute; yet even then the pen of its author at
times slipped and betrayed him into the use of the natural and
approved word, as, for example, where it makes the parties
'covenant and agree to and with each other . . . for the use and
benefit of the present and all future subscribers and stockholders.'
and again, in enumerating the multitudinous powers of the
trustees, it provides authority to hold and reissue the interest of
its capitalization 'its stock and other securities.' It follows, without need of further discussion at this point as to this objection,
that'the shares of capital in the so-called trust are stock within the
meaning of the law."
CRIMINAL PLEADING

Four Minnesota cases have to do with. the sufficiency
of indictments. They are State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Company," State v. Summerland,14 State v. Ogden,15 and State v.
Summerland."Sa In the first of these cases the indictment charged
several hales and was attacked as duplicitous. The court
sustained the indictment, holding that the charge was 'that of
offering and selling securities without a license. In the first
Summerland Case the indictment charged but one sale. It
was demurred to on the ground that it failed to charge a violation
of the law. The court sustained the demurrer, holding that where
"3(1920) 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.V. 937.
14(1921) 150 Minn. 266. 185 N.W. 255.
15(Minn. 1923) 191 N.W. 916.
15a(Minn. May 18, 1923.)
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an indictment alleges but one sale it thereby brings the charge
within the exception made by section 2 of the act, namely, that
the act shall not apply to single or isolated transactions. In view
of these decisions, the only safe course to pursue in drawing
indictments under a law such as the Minnesota law is to allege
several sales. In this way the exception with respect to single
or isolated transactions is negatived and without rendering the
pleading double. In the Ogden Case the court held an allegation
that defendant sold to a named person followed by the words,
"and others," a sufficient negation of the exception.
In the second Suminerland Case the court held that an indictment, charging a sale of securities to A, made in the course
of like transactions wherein like securities were sold to B and
C, states but one offense, namely, a sale to A, upon which the
state must rely for a conviction.
MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS PASSED ON

3Y THE COURTS

WHAT CONSTITUTES A SALE WITHIN THE MEANING OF
THE LAw?

In Edward v. Ioor,1 6 the question whether exchange of stock
constitutes a sale within the meaning of the law was before the
court. On the point the court said:
"The plan contemplated by these defendants provided for the
organization of a corporation under the laws of Arizona to take
over and hold the stock in the other companies, giving its own
stock in varying proportions in exchange therefor. It was to be
largely a holding company. Did the exchange of its stock for
that of the other companies constitute a sale within the meaning
of the Commission Act? This court has defined a sale as follows:
'A sale is a parting with one's interest in a thing for a valuable
Western Massachusetts Ins. Co. v. Riker, 10
consideration.'
Mich. 279. 'But every transfer of property for an equivalent is
practically and essentially a sale, and the deed of bargain and
sale is almost universally used to convey land so transferred.
Money's worth is a valuable consideration, as much as money
itself.' Huff v. Hall, 56 Mich. 456,23 N. W. 88. Bouvier defines
a sale as: "An agreement whereby the seller transfers the property
in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price."
3 Bouvier's Law Dict. 2983.
" "This definition has been adopted by the legislature of this
state in the Uniform Sales Act (Act 100, Public Acts 1913,
Comp. Laws 1915, 11,832 et Seq.)
"We must assume that the legislature had in mind this wellunderstbod meaning of the word "sale" when the Commission
26(1919) 205 Mich. 617, 172 N.V. 620, 16 A.L.R. 256.
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Act was passed. If the act is not so construed, as was suggested
upon the argument, one may exchange worthless stock for government bonds and escape with impunity. We are impressed
that when the Arizona Piano Company exchanged its stock for
that of other companies it was a sale of its stock within the meaning of the Commission Act."
In Rex v. Malcolm,'7 it was held that a "sale" of shares included an agreement to sell.
WHAT CONSTITUTES FRAUD IN THE SALE OF SECURITIES?

Whether a. sale of a given security will work a fraud on
investors is a question for determination by those charged with
carrying out the law. The courts are loath to disturb a finding
on this point; and do not unless the finding is based upon an
erroneous theory of the law, or unqualifiedly against the evidence, or arbitrary, unreasonable, unjust or against the best interest of the public.ls
In In re Investors' Syndicate,'9 the commission suspended the
license of the syndicate to sell a certain instalment savings certificate, on the ground that the sale thereof worked a fraud on
investors. The basis for the charge of fraud was that the history
of the sale of the certificate, extending over a period of six years,
disclosed that over half of the purchasers forfeited after making
a few payments and lost all they paid in. The court overruled
the commission, saying:
"The instalment certificate promises that, upon the making of
specified payments in advance for ten years, the syndicate will
pay the purchaser $1,000. This is the amount of the payments
made, with interest at 6 per cent. compounded annually. There
is a surrender value after two annual payments. The surrender
value for each of the first five years is less than the instalments
paid. From the sixth year on it exceeds the principal amounts
paid. Experience shows that a large number of the certificate
purchasers allow their certificates to lapse within a few years.
This means a loss to them. It means a gain, measured by book
values, to the syndicate. The objection of the commission is based
upon the constant lapsing of the certificates. . . The real objection to the instalment certificates comes from the fact that the
purchaser may not carry out his contract, and therefore loses
when he takes the surrender value, in short to many of the investors the investment is an improvident one. This is not because
of the fault of the syndicate. .

.

. The commission does not view

Alberta L.R. 511, 42 D.L.R. 90, 2 West. Week. Rep. 1081.
'sState v. Securities Commission, (1920) 145 Minn. 221, 176 N.W.
759; State ex rel. Saari v. State Securities Commission, (1921) 149 Minn.
101, 182 N.W. 910.
19(1920) 147 Minn. 217, 179 N.V. 1001.
17(1918)'13
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the savings contracts as of such a nature that the syndicate will
be unable to perform them. If it performs them the purchaser
will get what is promised. The investment contract'is often an
unprofitable one to the purchaser. It is so when he fails to make
his payments. We do not inquire as to the limits of the right
of the statute to supervise investment contracts of the general
nature of the one before us. It is .enough to say that the investment certificate does not work a fraud upoft purchasers within the
meaning of the statute."
WHAT ARE THE RIGHTS OF A PURCHASER OF A SECURITY SOLD
WITHOUT A LICENSE?

In Goodyear v. MeutX, 20 suit was brought to recover a balance
alleged to be due on a stock subscription contract. One of the
defenses interposed was that the issuer and seller of the stock and
its agents had failed to comply with the "Blue Sky Law." It was
insisted that the contract was as a consequence illegal and unenforcible. This defense was held good by the court.
The court said:
"The statute referred to, which is carried into Thompson's
Shannbn's Code, at section 36 0 8a 139 et seq., provides that all
local and foreign corporations, with certain designated exceptions, shall be known as investment companies. It provides that
before offering to sell any stock, bonds, or other securities of any
kind or character, except government, state, or municipal bonds,
or any lands or town lots, such corporations shall file statements
containing information particularized in"the act and shall pay a
fee of $25. The act further provides such companies shall file
additional statements at the close of business on December 31
and June 30 of each year, and it provides that no agent of such
companies shall do any business for them until such agents register
their names with the secretary of state and pay certain fees. It
is further enacted that any person or agent who undertakes to sell
the securities of companies which have not complied with the
statute, and that any such companies which undertake to do
business in the state without compliance therewith,. shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor punishable by penalties set out. It is provided
that the statute shall be complied with before any attempt to sell
stock or do any other business in the state is made.
"We think there can be no doubt but that the bankrupt corporation was one of the kind 'whose business and the sale of
whose securities this statute was designed to regulate. It appears
from the record that, when the subscription of defendant for
this stock was taken, this company was in default with reference
to the statements exacted of it by the statute, and it further
appears that the agents who sold the stock were not duly registered.
20(1920)

143 Tenn. 287, 228 S.r.

57.
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"The contract which was entered into with the defendant was
accordingly a contract prohibited by law, and the activities of the
corporation and its agents in this respect constituted a misdemeanor punishable by law.
"It is well settled that a contract entered into under these
circumstances cannot be enforced." 2'
In Edward v. Joor et al.,22 the Arizona Piano Company sold
some of its stock to plaintiff. The consideration passing from
plaintiff to the-company consisted of stocks in two other corporatiohs. The Arizona Piano Company had not secured a permit
from the Michigan Securities Commission to sell its stock in the
state. Plaintiff brought suit to recover the value of the stocks
assigned to the Arizona Piano Company. In the court below there
was judgment for defendants. On appeal a new trial was granted.
On the question as to the right of plaintiff to rescind and recover the value of the stocks parted with the court said:
"This sale to plaintiff of the stock of the Arizona Piano Company was in conflict with the terms of h penal statute, malum
prohibitum, and void, although not expressly declared so to be
by the statute."2
"Some of these cases are so recent and they so fully consider
the authorities and the principles involved that we forego further
discussion of the subject. When plaintiff's stock in the Arizona
Piano Company, received on this void contract, was tendered back,
he was entitled to the stocks he had assigned in payment therefor.
The transaction had been" rescinded, and upon its rescission he
was entitled to be restored to what he had parted with. Failure
to, restore. to him what he had parted with entitled him to its
value."
21
The court cited: Stevenson v. Ewing, (1888) 87 Tenn. 46, 9 S.W.
230; Cary-Lomberd Lumber Co. v. Thomas, (1893) 92 Tenn. 587, 22 S.W.
743; Haworth v. Montgomery, (1891) 91 Tenn. 16, 18 S.W. 399.
22(1919) 205 Mich. 617, 172 N.W. 620, 16 A.L.R. 256.
23
The court cited: Loranger v. Jardine, (1885) 56 Mich. 518, 23 N.W.
203; Niagara Falls Brewing Co. v. Wall, (1893) 98 Mich. 158, 57 N.W.
99; Re Reidy. (1893) 164' Mich.
167, 129 N.W. 196; Ferle v. Lansing,
(1915) 189 Mich. 501, 155 N.Mr . 591, L.R.A. 1907C 1096; Cashin v. Pliter,
(1912) 168 Mich. 386, 134 N.W. 482, Ann. Cas. 1913C 697; Mawer v.
Greening Nursery Co., (1917) 199 Mich. 522, 526, 165 N.W. 861, 168
N.W. 448.

